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Abstract
Background: Social capital is often believed to be one of the key prerequisites for successful implementation of
community-based health programs. In less-developed countries, local leaders are positioned as major players in
broad community health strategies and interventions, and their capacities and roles are expected to increase in
prominence in future community-health-care promotions. In this study, we examined how local leaders’ capacities
could be related to social capital in rural villages in Lao PDR, and thus to villagers’ willingness to participate in
community-based health efforts.
Methods: We adopted a qualitative approach, conducting semi-structured interviews for both individuals and focus
groups. In 2012, 103 people from six villages in the Khoun and Phoukoud districts participated in the interviews. For
the individual interviews, we interviewed 22 mothers who had given birth in the past 5 years. For the focus groups,
we interviewed 30 women (six groups), 30 men (six groups), and 21 senior villagers (five groups).
Results: First, we noted large variations in the levels of community social capital across villages: four out of six
study villages showed a high level of social capital, while two villages suffered greatly from a low level of social
capital. In search of the reasons for the disrupted social capital in the latter two villages, interviews revealed that
failed leadership, especially in regard to local resource allocations—lack of transparency and corrupt
practices—were commonly cited reasons for disrupted social capital. The data also showed that the villagers’
mistrust of these failed local leaders critically reduced their willingness to participate in community-based health
efforts, and especially in those that involved resource mobilization and risk-sharing for healthcare. Finally, we found
that good communication skills and participatory decision-making styles were attributes that rural villagers in Lao
PDR expected of their local leaders.
Conclusion: This study suggests that failed local leadership is detrimental to community participation, resource
mobilization, and building communities’ social capital. To achieve intended health care goals through community-
based interventions, there is a need to first support local leadership at all levels through capacity-building and
improved communication within communities.
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Background
Researchers have documented the potential role of social
capital in strengthening the effects of community-level
health efforts to improve health outcomes [1, 2]. In this
regard, by engaging the whole community in health-
promotion efforts, community-based interventions are
intended to facilitate collective efficacy within a commu-
nity, and foster the community’s ownership of and com-
mitment to these health initiatives. Strengthening social
capital and community capacity has thus been viewed as
one of the key prerequisites for successful implementa-
tion of community-based health and development
programs [2–4]. While it is critical to gain a better
understanding of the determinants of social capital for
developing interventions that will boost social capital for
purpose of health promotion, very little is yet known
about what determines the social capital of a com-
munity, and how social capital influences community
activities [5].
In particular, the role of local leaders is a potentially
profound yet understudied topic that could contribute
to our understanding of the relationship between social
capital and the success of community health interven-
tions in developing countries. More so than in developed
countries, local leaders in less-developed countries are
expected to establish bonds and close relationships with
members of their communities. This familiarity is often
a result of having lived among or near their constituents
for an extended period of time [6–9]. In addition, where
people are alike in terms of socio-demographic and
economic conditions, they are likely to share similar
social and cultural identities. Especially in a traditional
society, they are influential enough to induce change in
the social and cultural behaviors of communities [10]. In
this setting, local leaders are in a better position to influ-
ence trust, solidarity, and effective community networks
among villagers through various types of socio-economic
involvements [11].
Despite the clear significance of local leadership, not
all local leaders are well-intentioned and capable. They
often fail to meet the needs and expectations of their
communities, thereby destabilizing trusting relationships
with villagers [12, 13]. There is, however, a paucity of
research on villagers’ perceptions of such failures in local
leadership, and the potential ramifications of these failures
for community participation and resource mobilization
among villagers.
If community leadership does indeed critically influ-
ence community social capital, which is believed to be
one of the most important prerequisites for effective
community health interventions [1, 14, 15], then merely
putting forth larger budgets, advanced technologies,
additional training, or technical assistance will not ne-
cessarily produce successful outcomes. Efforts to address
the problems of leadership failures and weak social
capital within a community should precede, or at least
parallel, community-based efforts for health care. In the
context of less-developed countries with scarce financial
and human resources, the influence of local leaders can
be harnessed to optimize the use of available resources
to improve a community’s social capital.
In this regard, the distinctive roles played by local
leaders in rural settings in less-developed countries
ought to be better understood, in order to address social
and health intervention efforts at the community level.
In this study, based on qualitative data obtained through
in-depth interviews with local village people in Lao
PDR, we first looked into large variations in the level of
social capital across rural community settings. We then
examined how failed local leadership, as perceived by
local villagers, could explain disrupted social capital in
certain villages. We further explored how failed local
leadership and consequent disruption of social capital
could adversely influence community efforts, such as,
for example, by negatively affecting villagers’ inclinations
to participate in community-based efforts for health
care. Lastly, based on interview data, we discussed the
desired attributes of good local leadership that are
expected by local villagers.
Methods
This study reanalyzed the data used by Ngan and col-
leagues [16] and Sychareun and colleagues [17]. The
former study focused on the utilization of maternal
health care services, and the latter examined constraints
experienced by service providers when providing mater-
nal and child health services. The data were collected
through semi-structured interviews for individuals and
focus groups. To obtain information on health-care-
utilization practices, in-depth interviews with women
were aimed at understanding the participants’ personal
experiences with their local leadership in the context of
using health care services, such as whether they received
encouragement and access to services for example.
Then, focus group interviews were conducted separately
for groups of women, men, and the elderly, covering the
same range of topics as the individual in-depth in-
terviews, in order to identify the potentially differing
perspectives of the different demographic groups.
Sample and study setting
The data covered six provinces in northern Lao PDR,
including four villages (KLN, KLF, KHN, and KHF) in
the Khoun district, and two villages (PLN and PHF) in
the Phoukoud district. Pseudonyms were used through-
out this study. These six villages were selected through
theoretical sampling based on ethnic diversity and
geographical conditions such as distance to the closest
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health facility. Hmong is the major ethnicity in KHN,
KHF, and PHF, while Lao is the main ethnicity in KLN,
KLF, and PLN.
Within the chosen villages, participants were recruited
using the convenience sampling method. Interviews took
place away from distractions, in private, quiet, and com-
fortable places, such as a separate room in the village
center. Eleven interviewers from a Lao research team at
the University of Health Sciences in Lao PDR conducted
the individual interviews and focus groups. The semi-
structured interview protocol was pre-tested to assess
whether it was culturally relevant and acceptable to local
participants, that is to say, village community members.
The interviewers undertook a 3-day training course prior
to data collection in early and mid-January, 2012. Indi-
vidual interviews took about two and half hours to
complete, and focus groups took about 3 hours. As an
incentive to participate in the interviews, each inter-
viewee received some financial reward (equivalent to
one US dollar) or a small towel.
From February to March 2012, 103 people participated
in the interviews. Participants for the individual inter-
views included 22 mothers who had given birth in the
past 5 years, and the mean age of the mothers was 27.9
(SD = 6.4), ranging from 21 to 45 years of age. Focus
group participants comprised 30 women (in six groups),
30 men (in six groups), and 21 senior villagers (in five
groups). The mean age of participants for the focus
groups was 39.1 (SD = 15.0) (Table 1).
Data analysis
All interviews were conducted using either Lao or Hmong,
depending on participants’ language preferences. Audio-
recorded responses were transcribed in Lao and Hmong
and typed into a computer word-processing program, to-
gether with observation notes taken during the interviews.
Transcriptions were translated from Lao and Hmong into
English, and uploaded into QSR NVivo 10, a data-analysis
program for the coding and retrieval of qualitative data.
The research team used inductive coding to identify pat-
terns in the data to establish themes [18]. The first round
of coding was an open initial coding of the data, with a
focus on individual cases of participants. In the second
round, the coding was issue-focused [19] and the re-
searchers examined participants’ attitudes toward local
leadership and leaders’ roles in community health interven-
tions. Multiple coding processes were carried out based on
key phrases, and codes were organized by common cat-
egories and sub-categories. While organizing the multiple
layers of codes, characteristics of villages and village heads
were analyzed and categorized. Regular meetings were held
to discuss thematic categories, and to arrive at a list of
recurrent themes.
The protocols for individual interviews received insti-
tutional review board (IRB) approval from the Ethics
Committee for Health Research, at the University of
Health Sciences, Lao PDR. The design protocol called
for voluntary participation in the interviews, and re-
searchers received participants’ informed consent prior
to each interview. Participants were informed of the
purpose of the study prior to the interview session, and
gave their verbal consent for the interviews to be re-
corded. They were informed that they could stop the in-
terviews at any time, and were assured of confidentiality.
Results
Village-level variations in levels of social capital
First, we present evidence that there are large variations
in the level of social capital across rural villages in Lao
PDR. To assess the level of social capital present in a
village, we follow the structural and cognitive distinction
that has gained prominence in the current literature
Table 1 Study sample of selected villages and respondents
Villagea Number of





Number of focus group
participants (B)
Description of Village
KLN 17 5 2b 12 Khoun District, Lao-dominated, located
close to local health centers
KLF 21 4 3 17 Khoun District, Lao-dominated, located
far from local health centers
KHN 17 2 3 15 Khoun District, Hmong-dominated,
located close to local health centers
KHF 17 4 3 13 Khoun District, Hmong-dominated,
located far from local health centers
PLN 16 4 3 12 Phoukoud District, Lao-dominated,
located close to local health centers
PHF 15 3 3 12 Phoukoud District, Hmong-dominated,
located far from local health centers
Total 103 22 17 81
apseudonyms were used
bno focus groups for the elderly group were conducted in KLN
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[20]. Structural and cognitive social capital are two
mutually reinforcing conceptual dimensions: the struc-
tural dimension involves group membership, civic en-
gagement, and social support from the community; the
cognitive dimension concerns trust, social harmony,
reciprocity, and a sense of belonging [20, 21]. Based on
these themes of structural and cognitive social capital,
we assess participants’ experiences with, and perceptions
of, fellow villagers, to categorize our study villages into
two groups: villages with a high level of social capital,
and villages with a low level of social capital.
Villages with a high level of social capital
Our interview data from the villages of KHF, KLF, KHN,
and PLN indicated that the interviewees in these villages
conveyed that there was a high level of social capital
among the community members. For example, a mother
from KHF explained how village members often helped
each other:
In our village, there is a friendship and solidarity
among us, such that we can borrow money from each
other when we are sick…. Moreover, we provide social
and psychological support to each other. When
someone is sick, we collect money from neighbors,
20,000 to 30,000 kip each. The neighbors also bring
the patients to hospital. (KHF, Hmong, early 20s).
The above response shows that the villagers were will-
ing to lend money without any interest, and that they
would readily help the sick both financially and psy-
chologically. These mutually beneficial and cooperative
behaviors reflect a high level of structural social capital
among the villagers.
Similarly, in the other three villages, the villagers
would take good care of the sick, willingly help patients’
families by sharing food, cultivating rice fields on behalf
of patients’ families, lending money, providing trans-
portation to the hospital, and giving moral support in
various forms.
When there was someone getting sick in a family, the
villagers assisted them. For example, assisting in
transportation to the hospital. When the sick family
did not have enough money, the villagers collected
money together. In addition, they also helped with
cultivating and harvesting rice. After finishing their
own rice field, people assist others to do their rice field,
especially the sick families. (KLF, Lao, late 40s).
In the past there was a family that got sick. They
vomited and weren’t able to eat, and had diarrhea.
People collected money and helped to take them to the
district hospital. People in the village did not stop
helping them until the sick family got better. (KHN,
Hmong, early 30s).
Our people support each other during the cultivation
season. We also look after and care about the sick. We
make contributions to help them cover medical costs,
and visit them after discharging from hospital. (PLN,
Lao, late 20s).
Not surprisingly, there was evidence that structural
and cognitive dimensions of social capital are mutually
reinforcing in these four villages: social support among
villagers is driven by a sense of trust, reciprocity, and
connectedness among villagers, which is in turn
strengthened by social support, as noted in the following
comment:
I trust my villagers because they help one another. For
example, when I had any troubles, they came to help
me all the times, even when I didn’t ask for assistance.
(KLF, Lao, early 30s).
In general, such a strong sense of connectedness and
social support in times of illness and emergencies among
community members indicates a high level of social
capital, which is essential for successful community-
based health efforts.
Villages with a low level of social capital
In contrast, our interviews indicate that, among the six
villages, villagers from the two villages of KLN and PHF
were experiencing symptoms of a low level of social cap-
ital. In those villages, interviewees reported that they
were not willing to engage in civic activities such as
communal works and village meetings. For example, a
village participant from KLN said that people in her vil-
lage possessed no solidarity and did not want to engage
in any civic activities that required community
participation.
People in our village do not have solidarity. For
example, they do not share labor and they do not
attend village meetings. (KLN, Lao, early 30s).
Given that the agricultural environment of rural Lao
PDR requires a lot of collective labor and shared use of
public facilities and resources [22], such poor civic
engagement may reduce agricultural productivity, and
offer more cause for concern about means to implement
viable community health programs. Similarly, a partici-
pant from PHF responded to the question on whether
she could be expected to get help from her village mem-
bers as follows:
No, if there is any problem, they will not help, and if
we would like to borrow money, they will not help
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either. Someone might have money but they will not
give you any, even as a loan. When we don’t have rice,
they will help only a little…. (PHF, Hmong, early 30s).
In addition to low levels of structural social capital,
the data suggest that the two villages, KLN and PHF,
suffer from disrupted cognitive social capital, namely,
lack of trust, solidarity, and a sense of belonging among
villagers. The following interview response showed that
a lack of solidarity existed among villagers:
During the flooding in 2011, there was nobody to help
me. I cried as my house, rice, and other things were
flooded. I called for help, but nobody came to help
me…the villagers did not have any friendship or
solidarity among themselves; the villagers hated each
other. (KLN, Lao, mid 20s).
According to this participant, distrust and animosity
were prevalent among the villagers. In addition, villagers
described their neighbors as “insincere” and “without
solidarity.” Furthermore, a woman from KLN said that
due to the lack of community solidarity in her village,
villagers she knew would not be willing to participate in
the much-needed mother-and-child health programs:
I think it is difficult to motivate them to actively
participate in development programs, including
mother and child health programs, since they have no
spirit of solidarity. (KLN, Lao, early 30s).
The above responses illustrate that these villagers har-
bored high levels of mistrust, and maintained attitudes of
watching out only for individuals’ self-interest. This situ-
ation would only lead to low demand for community-based
health programs, especially in scenarios when resource
mobilization and risk-sharing are deemed necessary. Vil-
lagers would not benefit from utilizing social networks
within their community in times of need. They would be
unwilling to help each other and share labor or resources,
both of which are common practices for the sustain-
able existence of most rural agricultural communities
in Lao PDR [22].
Failed leadership and disrupted social capital
We now turn to an examination of the potential factors
that might lead to different levels of social capital across
villages. In particular, the study focuses on the roles of
local leadership. Interview data revealed that participants
from the villages of KLN and PHF (characterized by
disrupted social capital) perceived failed village leader-
ship, and described how these leaders affected social
capital in their villages, which in turn precipitated their
unwillingness to participate in community-based health
efforts such as a village fund. Local leaders’ failures in
the two villages of KLN and PHF took various forms,
but embezzlement and favoritism were the most com-
monly mentioned causes.
Embezzlement
Notably, corruption scandals involving village leaders are
probably the most serious barrier to creating social co-
hesion and trust within communities. In particular, inter-
view participants in KLN and PHF reported many forms
of corruption, which included fraud, abuse, or misman-
agement of public resources. A participant from KLN
village explained in detail how several instances of
corruption led her to mistrust her village head. For
example, she described the village head’s embezzlement
of government aid and company compensation funds
intended for her family:
I do not like the village head. For example,
hydropower equipment was to be constructed in my
paddy field. The electric company said to pay for
compensation of nineteen million kips…after arriving
home and checking the money that the village head
delivered, we found out that we got only nine million
kips….The village head told us that he would ask
about it and get the remaining money for us back,
but we have not received anything yet. (KLN, Lao,
early 30s).
In addition to embezzling external aid and compensa-
tion funds, the same village head was also thought to
have mismanaged community budgets:
When there was flooding in our village in 2011, the
province provided money to the village. The village
head went to get money at the provincial office, but he
did not give that money to people. And, when
assistance with relief supplies came from the province,
the village head gave them only to his relatives. (KLN,
Lao, early 30s).
A participant from PHF reported a series of corrupt
practices by a local leader, which explained why the
village head lost the trust of villagers in that community:
One case concerning the rice bank: people kept rice in
the village’s rice bank, but when they needed rice back,
they could not get it and rice disappeared. Another
story: when officials from the province visited our
village, the village head asked each household for
50,000 kips to buy goats for preparing a welcome party
for those guests, but villagers never saw any goats
during the party. Most of the villagers did not trust the
village head. (PHF, Hmong, early 30s).
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Nepotism and favoritism
Villagers’ perceptions of local leaders’ practices that leaned
towards nepotism or favoritism and other biased acts were
prevalent across the villages of KLN and PHF. The data
revealed that the nepotism of village heads manifests itself
in two forms: granting decision-making power to selected
groups, and unfair distribution of limited resources. First,
the village head of KLN granted family members and close
relatives political power to make important decisions on
behalf of the community. One community member of
KLN explained what she witnessed:
Mostly, the village head tries to involve people that he
knows and he is familiar with. For example, the head
of the Lao Women’s Union (LWU) is a relative of the
village head. (KLN, Lao, mid 20s).
In some villages, village heads’ relatives were selected
as the main beneficiaries of financial and medical aid,
despite their lack of eligibility for these benefits. At the
time of the interviews, five out of six study villages man-
aged health equity funds, and three villages had village
funds. Some communities ran their own projects, such
as a rice bank and animal funds, supported by external
development agencies. Our interviews revealed that
many villagers from KLN and PHF witnessed significant
preferentialism toward the relatives of village heads
during beneficiary selection processes. For example,
The village head selected his relatives and people who
work with him…the village head made decisions based
on his own interests and for his closest relations
without any consideration for the poorest families…I
know there were seven poor families in the village.
(KLN, Lao, early 30s).
In the village of PHF, there were similar claims that
the village head’s family members received the most
benefits from health care programs, while more needy
candidates were excluded. Besides this preferential bene-
ficiary selection, several participants reported that their
deputy village head claimed the most arable banana field,
and then distributed less arable areas to other villagers.
Similarly, it was reported that in serving his family’s
interests, the village head unfairly acquired the rice field
closest to the village, while others were allocated rice
fields far from their homes.
Failed leadership and community health promotion efforts
As shown above, in KLN and PHF, many villagers
expressed anger and disappointment with what they
perceived to be corrupt and unfair decision-making by
their village leaders. More notably, where there is suspi-
cion and hostility toward local leaders, there is also a
tendency toward discontent among village members,
and distrust toward new practices proposed by their
local leaders. In these contexts, the fair use of funds and
transparent beneficiary selection processes were seen as
being significant, not only because money or in-kind
transfers were involved, but also because villagers’ nega-
tive experiences were likely to adversely influence their
willingness to participate in future community activities.
The data show that in the KLN and PHF villages,
villagers seemed to be notably pessimistic about
community-based funds for health interventions. The
village heads in these two villages seemed to have lost
the villagers’ confidence that they could manage com-
munity resources and treat all villagers fairly, so the
villagers were not convinced they should be involved
in such community-based efforts.
I think it is possible to have a village fund in our
village to help people who are sick, only if we get a
new village head whom we can trust and who is
sincere. The villagers don’t dare to give more money
because they don’t trust the village head anymore
since we don’t know what the village head will spend
money on. (KLN, Lao, mid 20s).
Such corrupt practices by village heads posed the
biggest obstacle to mobilizing community members and
optimizing the use of collective resources. A respondent
from PHF village reported that their village leaders did
not properly manage a rice bank program, which they
believed reduced trust toward village authorities:
A village revolving fund would be good because people
could borrow money to spend on health care or buying
cattle. However, we are scared of anything that looks
like the revolving rice fund that we once had. The
village leader who was responsible for the revolving
rice fund didn’t record accurately about who had
borrowed rice….After that, none of the villagers trusted
him any more. (PHF, elderly focus groups).
Though a majority of villagers agreed on the need for
a new village fund to help the poor and the sick, their
previous negative and disappointing experiences with
how their village authorities managed the rice fund
made them wary, and reluctant to participate in new
community-based funds.
Expected attributes for successful local leadership
While the two villages of KLN and PHF were reported
to have suffered the most from the failures in the leader-
ship of their village heads, the other four villages main-
tained relatively stable and trusting relationships with
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local leaders. Local leaders in these villages can be char-
acterized as having the following attributes.
Capability of effective communication
Local leaders are expected to be effective communica-
tion channels through which external information enters
and spreads throughout a community, so that villagers
may benefit from access to this information. When a
health staff member from the province or district ap-
proaches a village, they first provide information to the
local leaders (i.e., a village head) and this leader is
expected to disseminate the information to the village.
To introduce a new community project, local leaders are
expected to hold information sessions to both dissemin-
ate information and receive feedback. At community
meetings such as a town hall meeting for example, de-
tails of a new project are communicated to members; at
the same time, members’ voiced concerns are heard, and
suggestions are made. Some village leaders were per-
ceived as capable of delivering on their roles as effective
information sources or channels:
He is good at sharing information…he immediately
informs people of whatever he receives, for instance,
information about immunizations. (KHF, Lao, early 20s).
We have a good village head because he always
announces when we have a meeting. For example, when
health staff visits our village, he encourages us to bring
our children to the village hall. (PLN, Lao, late 20s).
In contrast, villagers from the two villages with failed
local leadership pointed out that the low level of partici-
pation in civic activities and health campaigns may also
come from poor communication. An interview response
from KLN indicated that the village head was not an ef-
fective communicator:
I never participated in village activities because I did
not know or hear, and was not aware of the village
activities. When I asked other people about the plan
for village activities, they didn’t know either. Nobody
told us about them. (KLN, Lao, mid 20s).
This respondent complained that she never partici-
pated in community activities because neither her neigh-
bors nor the village head had ever notified her that these
meetings would be taking place. In this regard, the
village leader failed to have the attributes of successful
local leadership in terms of communication.
Participatory decision-making
Hierarchical relationships between local leadership and
village members can create tension and conflict when
there are competing interests such as the selection of
recipients for financial or food aid. In these instances,
villagers are understandably interested in knowing how
local authorities and leadership committees make these
important decisions.
Village participants from KHF perceived that they had
a good relationship with their village head, and seemed
to be satisfied with the way their leaders made decisions
on behalf of the villagers. They reported that they were
fully informed of the criteria for beneficiary selection,
and believed that the village funds that had been allo-
cated had helped needy villagers in their community:
We are happy with the village head’s government.
When we had conflict and quarrels, he was able to
negotiate: for example, recently when we weren’t able
to finish harvesting on time, he consulted with
committee members to find the way to solve this
problem…he requested the youth in the village to help
finish harvesting. (KHF, Hmong, early 20s).
For the health equity fund, all villagers join to select
families who have no property such as paddy fields
and cattle. (KHF, Lao, early 20s).
Villagers from KLF also reported that their village
head was eager to encourage village members to partici-
pate in making a decision about village affairs.
When a water pipe in the village was stuck, he
called all villagers to repair it together. In case of
having a project coming, he also called all villagers
to come for a meeting, informed them about the
project, and asked them whether they agree to have
it. (KLF, Lao, early 20s).
In our village, we now have a village fund. Before
introducing the project, to promote community
participation, the village leader gathered the villagers
together to inform about the project and asked their
opinions about the project. (KLF, Lao, late 20s).
In contrast, in the two villages with failed local leadership,
villagers were excluded from important decision-making
processes or were not informed properly of decisions that
concern them, so they doubted the sincerity and leadership
of their village heads:
The village head and his committee decided who they
would give money as loans, and then informed us later
who they gave money to. I want the village head to
discuss with the villagers before decisions like this are
made. (KLN, Lao, late 30s).
I would like to know everything and would like to have
people join decision-making process in all its aspects.
(PHF, Hmong, early 30s).
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In their mistrust of the selection process for benefi-
ciaries of the village funds, study participants in KLN
and PHF questioned their leaders’ intentions, wanted to
know whether the process was rational and fair, and also
showed a keen interest in participating in this decision-
making process.
Discussion
With the goal of better understanding how social capital
can be improved and transformed into community cap-
acity, our study focused on the role of the local leader-
ship in rural community settings in Lao PDR. In many
less-developed, local leaders such as village heads, elders,
and traditional authorities in Lao PDR are often key
decision-makers for community development and health
efforts [8, 9, 12, 23]. Especially village heads—who are
elected every 3 years by receiving the highest number of
votes among five candidates who were screened by dis-
trict Party officials and the Governor’s office—can be
influential enough to induce changes in the social and
cultural behaviors of communities [10, 24]. Village heads
are responsible for various administrative duties that
include but are not limited to “solving conflicts, keeping
village records, facilitating local development efforts, and
more recently collecting taxes” [24]. Based on qualitative
interviews with villagers, we were able to identify areas
and ways in which local leaders were perceived to have
failed to fulfill their responsibilities. We also explored
how such failures affected community social capital in
terms of villagers’ acceptance of, and willingness to par-
ticipate in, community-based health programs.
Our findings can be summarized and discussed as
follows: First, from our interview data, we noted signifi-
cant variations in the levels of social capital across
villages. Interviewees from two villages commonly and
persistently conveyed the lack of social capital, whereas
in the remaining four villages we observed evidence of
not only a strong sense of social connectedness, but also
social support among villagers. In the villages with a
high level of social capital, villagers were very willing to
help each other by providing both psychological and
physical support for the poor and the sick. We also
found that these villages benefit from high levels of
cognitive social capital among villagers, such as trust,
reciprocity, and a sense of connectedness [25]. In con-
trast, in the villages with a low level of social capital, we
observed villagers’ unwillingness to help each other in
times of need, which in turn could lead to psychological
distress and increased risk of poor physical health
among villagers [26–29]. Pregnant women and children
are probably those most vulnerable to this lack of
solidarity and reciprocity among villagers, because their
health and wellbeing are known to benefit from the
village communities’ social support [30].
Secondly, interviews revealed that failed leadership
was a commonly cited reason for disrupted social
capital. While most villages in Lao PDR have Conflict
Resolution Committees (khai khia) to resolve civil
disputes among villagers (e.g., land disputes, marital
disputes, and petty crimes), there are no formalized sys-
tems to address village heads’ poor administration and/
or bad leadership [24]. Frequently, failed local leadership
due to a lack of transparency, as well as corrupt prac-
tices in local resource allocations were identified in this
study. Many interview participants from the villages with
failed leadership vividly reported specific corruption
practices in which their village heads are allegedly in-
volved. Moreover, village heads’ unfair practices were
prevalent in the villages during the process of selecting
beneficiaries of community-based programs that in-
volved financial and medical benefits for the sick. This
finding is also consistent with prior literature that under-
scores the significance of local leaders as a critical com-
ponent of community capacity [31, 32] and sources of
social capital [33]. Our results also support the view that
local leaders are in a position to directly and indirectly
influence trust, solidarity, and effective community net-
works among villagers through their involvement in the
social and political life of their community [11].
Of greater importance, we observed evidence of poor
mobilization for potential community-based health inter-
ventions as a result of failure in local leadership in the
villages with a low level of social capital. The data showed
that when villagers perceived their leaders as being cor-
rupt, their mistrust reduced their willingness to participate
in the programs involving resource mobilization and risk-
sharing, such as village revolving funds and community-
based health insurance. This result is consistent with pre-
vious studies that found community-level social capital
(e.g., strong trust-based relationships among their
community members) is a crucial determinant of the
success of community-based health insurance programs
[1, 14, 15]. However, our findings extend prior research by
demonstrating that local leadership failure, as perceived
by villagers, impedes uptake and effective implementation
of community-based health interventions.
Finally, our interviews revealed Lao PDR villagers’
expectations that their leaders should have good com-
munication skills and participatory decision-making
styles. Our findings lead us to understand that in
capacity building, an important skill or capability of local
leaders is not only to communicate openly and fre-
quently, but also to invite community members to voice
and share their opinions. Despite the potential for, and
prominence of, this role, local leaders do not always
meet their communities’ expectations. Local leaders who
adopt authoritarian and patriarchal approaches are
viewed as barriers to improved community health: the
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“dominance of one leader” can lead to manipulation of
the distribution of resources and benefits within com-
munities [23].
Limitations
Although this study provided valuable insights into the
role local leadership plays in community participation
and resource mobilization for community-level health
efforts and building community social capital, some limi-
tations should be noted. First, the voluntary nature of
the interviews may exacerbate possible issues related to
self-selection into the study population, which could bias
the results of the study. The extent to which the findings
can be generalized will be limited by the fact that the
sample population was not randomly selected, or nation-
ally representative. Similarly, since a majority of the
participants were women with children and elderly men
and women, readers should keep this sample restriction
in mind when interpreting the results. Second, despite
the study’s decent sample size, all representative opin-
ions or themes may not have emerged from the data
since sampling did not continue until informational
redundancy or saturation was achieved [34, 35]. Third,
this study focuses on villagers’ perceptions of local lead-
ership and how these perceptions affect their willingness
to join community-based health efforts; it does not take
into account the views of the local leadership, though we
interviewed them. While it is possible that the local lead-
ership would have different views on their leadership
experiences and capabilities, we relied on villagers’ re-
sponses because we viewed the villagers’ perceptions,
rather than local leadership’s actual performance, as the
determinant of acceptance of, and willingness to partici-
pate in, community-based health programs.
Conclusions
The findings of this study could be policy-relevant.
While community-based health interventions should
include measures to encourage the community’s active
participation, this study suggests that these interventions
must be accompanied by efforts to address governance
concerns regarding expectations for good local leader-
ship. Failures of local leadership are detrimental to the
successful implementation of community-based health
efforts, especially when those leaders are entrusted with
mobilizing, pooling, allocating, managing, and supervis-
ing health-care resources [13, 36–38].
In order to achieve intended health-care goals through
well-received community-based interventions, there is a
need, therefore, to support local leadership through cap-
acity building, by establishing mutually-trusting relation-
ships and enhanced communication within communities.
One fundamental step might be to promote the sound and
transparent management of village affairs, by having policy
makers involve the entire community in decision-making
processes, and especially in the allocation and management
of pooled or public financial resources. In doing so, the
roles of less-trusted local leaders would be limited, while
whole-community participation can be enhanced.
To conclude, this study provides evidence that failed or
weak local leaders discourage community mobilization,
which is an essential ingredient of successful implementa-
tion of community-based health efforts [20, 21]. In this
regard, this study serves as an important reminder to pol-
icy makers, that successful implementation of community
health intervention programs depends on the capacity of
local leadership as well as villagers. If the prerequisite
social capital at the community level cannot be activated,
new community health programs aimed at promoting
community participation and mobilizing local resources
are not likely to be effective.
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